Games without rules
| dc.contributor.author | Menezes, Flavio | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Quiggin, John | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2003-06-23 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2004-05-19T06:57:05Z | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-01-05T08:24:55Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2004-05-19T06:57:05Z | en_US |
| dc.date.available | 2011-01-05T08:24:55Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2002 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 2002 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 302558 bytes | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 350 bytes | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/octet-stream | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1885/40258 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/40258 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_AU | en_US |
| dc.subject | game theory | en_US |
| dc.subject | Nash equilibria | en_US |
| dc.subject | equilibrium concepts | en_US |
| dc.subject | folk theorem | en_US |
| dc.title | Games without rules | en_US |
| dc.type | Working/Technical Paper | en_US |
| local.citation | Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics no.424 | en_US |
| local.contributor.affiliation | School of Economics | en_US |
| local.contributor.affiliation | ANU | en_US |
| local.description.refereed | no | en_US |
| local.identifier.citationmonth | nov | en_US |
| local.identifier.citationyear | 2002 | en_US |
| local.identifier.eprintid | 1478 | en_US |
| local.rights.ispublished | no | en_US |
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