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Games without rules

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Date

2002

Authors

Menezes, Flavio
Quiggin, John

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Abstract

We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium.

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Keywords

game theory, Nash equilibria, equilibrium concepts, folk theorem

Citation

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http://hdl.handle.net/1885/40258
 http://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/40258

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ANU Research Publications

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Working/Technical Paper

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Restricted until

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