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When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

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dc.contributor.authorMailath, George
dc.contributor.authorNocke, Volker
dc.contributor.authorWhite, Lucy
dc.date.accessioned2021-04-07T04:47:31Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.date.updated2020-11-23T11:27:50Z
dc.description.abstractIn repeated normal‐form (simultaneous‐move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, Journal of Economic Theory 39(1) (1986), 191–225; and Econometrica 56(2) (1988), 383–96) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame‐perfect outcomes. We show that in repeated extensive‐form games such a characterization no longer obtains. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame‐perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator but also to the nature of the deviation.en_AU
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_AU
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598en_AU
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/229700
dc.language.isoen_AUen_AU
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltden_AU
dc.rights© (2017) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Associationen_AU
dc.sourceInternational Economic Reviewen_AU
dc.source.urihttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/iere.12219en_AU
dc.titleWhen and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crimeen_AU
dc.typeJournal articleen_AU
local.bibliographicCitation.issue2en_AU
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage330en_AU
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage315en_AU
local.contributor.affiliationMailath, George, College of Business and Economics, ANUen_AU
local.contributor.affiliationNocke, Volker, University of Cailforniaen_AU
local.contributor.affiliationWhite, Lucy, Boston Universityen_AU
local.contributor.authoruidMailath, George, u5107368en_AU
local.description.embargo2099-12-31
local.description.notesImported from ARIESen_AU
local.identifier.absfor140104 - Microeconomic Theoryen_AU
local.identifier.ariespublicationu5564265xPUB39en_AU
local.identifier.citationvolume58en_AU
local.identifier.doi10.1111/iere.12219en_AU
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-85020039351
local.publisher.urlhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.comen_AU
local.type.statusPublished Versionen_AU

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