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When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

Date

2017

Authors

Mailath, George
Nocke, Volker
White, Lucy

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Abstract

In repeated normal‐form (simultaneous‐move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, Journal of Economic Theory 39(1) (1986), 191–225; and Econometrica 56(2) (1988), 383–96) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame‐perfect outcomes. We show that in repeated extensive‐form games such a characterization no longer obtains. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame‐perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator but also to the nature of the deviation.

Description

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Citation

Source

International Economic Review

Type

Journal article

Book Title

Entity type

Access Statement

License Rights

DOI

10.1111/iere.12219

Restricted until

2099-12-31