Strategic risk aversion

dc.contributor.authorShaffer, Sherrill
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-10T22:31:24Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.date.updated2016-02-24T09:09:17Z
dc.description.abstractThis article demonstrates that exaggerated risk aversion may comprise a rational form of strategic behaviour in the face of asymmetric information. Unlike some other forms of strategic behaviour analysed previously, this behaviour confers a benefit in the form of higher ex post consumption (not merely higher expected consumption or expected utility) and whether or not markets are perfectly competitive.
dc.identifier.issn0960-3107
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/55509
dc.publisherRoutledge, Taylor & Francis Group
dc.sourceApplied Financial Economics
dc.subjectKeywords: asymmetric information; competition (economics); consumption behavior; market conditions; risk factor Asymmetric information; Contingent claims; Risk aversion; Strategic behaviour
dc.titleStrategic risk aversion
dc.typeJournal article
local.bibliographicCitation.issue13
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage956
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage949
local.contributor.affiliationShaffer, Sherrill, College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU
local.contributor.authoruidShaffer, Sherrill, u4757163
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.absfor140207 - Financial Economics
local.identifier.absseo910199 - Macroeconomics not elsewhere classified
local.identifier.ariespublicationf5625xPUB331
local.identifier.citationvolume21
local.identifier.doi10.1080/09603107.2011.556587
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-79960184487
local.type.statusPublished Version

Downloads

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
01_Shaffer_Strategic_risk_aversio_2011.pdf
Size:
151.38 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format