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Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency

dc.contributor.authorGrant, Simon
dc.contributor.authorKajii, Atsushi
dc.contributor.authorPolak, Ben
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-13T23:16:04Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.date.updated2015-12-12T08:46:27Z
dc.description.abstractWe provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent.
dc.identifier.issn0040-5833
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/89216
dc.publisherKluwer Academic Publishers
dc.sourceTheory and Decision
dc.subjectKeywords: Anxiety; Dynamic consistency; Information; Non-expected utility; Randomization
dc.titlePreference for Information and Dynamic Consistency
dc.typeJournal article
local.contributor.affiliationGrant, Simon, College of Business and Economics, ANU
local.contributor.affiliationKajii, Atsushi, University of Tsukuba
local.contributor.affiliationPolak, Ben, Yale University
local.contributor.authoruidGrant, Simon, u8611182
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.description.refereedYes
local.identifier.absfor140103 - Mathematical Economics
local.identifier.ariespublicationMigratedxPub19174
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-0041729407
local.type.statusPublished Version

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