Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency
| dc.contributor.author | Grant, Simon | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kajii, Atsushi | |
| dc.contributor.author | Polak, Ben | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-12-13T23:16:04Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2000 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2015-12-12T08:46:27Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent. | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0040-5833 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1885/89216 | |
| dc.publisher | Kluwer Academic Publishers | |
| dc.source | Theory and Decision | |
| dc.subject | Keywords: Anxiety; Dynamic consistency; Information; Non-expected utility; Randomization | |
| dc.title | Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency | |
| dc.type | Journal article | |
| local.contributor.affiliation | Grant, Simon, College of Business and Economics, ANU | |
| local.contributor.affiliation | Kajii, Atsushi, University of Tsukuba | |
| local.contributor.affiliation | Polak, Ben, Yale University | |
| local.contributor.authoruid | Grant, Simon, u8611182 | |
| local.description.embargo | 2037-12-31 | |
| local.description.notes | Imported from ARIES | |
| local.description.refereed | Yes | |
| local.identifier.absfor | 140103 - Mathematical Economics | |
| local.identifier.ariespublication | MigratedxPub19174 | |
| local.identifier.scopusID | 2-s2.0-0041729407 | |
| local.type.status | Published Version |
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