Accounting Manipulations and Political Costs: Tooth & Co. Ltd 1910-65

Abstract

Positive accounting theory posits that political costs influence accounting choices by large firms. Most studies rely on cross-sectional analyses of large samples using coarse data. We employ rich archival data to analyse the profit measurement and disclosure practices of Tooth & Co, a large Australian brewing company, from 1910 to 1965. This period provides considerable variation in scope and incentives to manipulate reported profit. Reporting discretion changed significantly from early voluntary disclosure through to the extensive scheduled disclosure requirements of the Companies Act 1961. Varying incentives include changes in excise duties levied on beer production, and dramatic company growth and market dominance resulting from takeovers of competitors and vertical integration. We examine the pattern of reported profit in relation to internal records and the pattern of accruals. We find that Tooth's profit-smoothing practices and understatements were perceived by management as important in justifying dividend policy, while systematic understatements of reported profit were used to avoid potential political costs associated with high profitability and market dominance. The most significant relative increases in profit understatement are shown to occur where dividend policy and political cost motivations coincide.