Implications of global demographic convergence for fertility theory

Abstract

Introduction: Concern with below-replacement fertility first emerged in Europe in the 1930s. At the end of a steep decline in marital fertility that had begun in most of western and central Europe in the last third of the 19th century, total fertility fell below two in several countries, and in many urban areas, even in countries whose national fertility remained above replacement level. This was a cause of great alarm to governments wherever it occurred, raising the spectre of absolute declines in population size in the near future (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). Dire economic and political consequences were predicted for countries whose populations failed to replace themselves (Reddaway 1939). The postwar baby boom of the 1950s and early 1960s generally erased such fears, but they have returned, albeit in somewhat less strident form, over the last two decades. Ever since the 1930s the concern with low fertility has been strongest within developed countries and especially in Europe. The theoretical frameworks used to explain such low fertility have been, therefore, almost exclusively oriented towards conditions in the rich world. Today however, we are rapidly moving into a world in which below-replacement fertility is common in both developing and developed countries. As is shown below, 50% of the world’s population now live where total fertility is 2.3 or less. Given the pace of fertility decline in most countries, it is virtually certain that a majority of the world’s people will live in places where fertility is below the level of long-run replacement by 2010, probably by 2005. This radical change to the demographic regimes of developing countries calls for a fundamental reassessment of fertility theories. Since below-replacement fertility will soon be a very general phenomenon, it cannot be explained solely in terms of factors that apply mostly or solely in developed countries. We must broaden our theoretical frame so as to encompass explanations for very low fertility in a wide range of economic and social circumstances. This paper is a first step towards such a re-orientation. Rather than consider the issue of low fertility in terms of a demographic transition model, the paper uses the notion of demographic convergence as its organising principle. The concept of convergence lies at the heart of demographic transition theory. However, as Oeppen (1999: 11) puts it, “Despite this, there seems to have been no attempt to address convergence in a formal way.” This is in marked contrast with economics, where quantitative assessments of convergence form a central part of modern economic growth theory (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1999, Jones 1997, Landau et al. 1996). Oeppen’s work on life expectancy and that of Chesnais (1997) are among the few papers to deal with convergence explicitly, while Heuveline (1999) considers the consequences of convergence on a regional and global scale. The present paper builds on results presented in Wilson (2001) to consider the theoretical implications of the global convergence in fertility that has occurred since 1950. The paper begins with a consideration of the data available for the study of convergence, before going on to assess the scale and nature of convergence in fertility since 1950. It then considers two case studies of below-replacement fertility in two developing country populations that stand as examples of the “unlikely” circumstances under which very low fertility can occur. The cases chosen for detailed examination are the capital city of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, and the most socially and economically disadvantaged group in Kerala State, India, the Scheduled Castes. The paper concludes by outlining the main implications for theory of the observed trends and suggesting directions for future theoretical development.