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Simple complexity from imitation games

Date

Authors

McLennan, Andrew

Tourky, Rabee

Publisher

Academic Press

Abstract

We give simple proofs of refinements of the complexity results of Gilboa and Zemel (1989), and we derive additional results of this sort. Our constructions employ imitation games, which are two person games in which both players have the same sets of pure strategies and the second player wishes to play the same pure strategy as the first player.

Keywords

Keywords: Complexity; Imitation games; NASH; Quadratic programming; Stationary points; Symmetric games; Symmetric Nash equilibria

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/1885/61844

Collections

ANU Research Publications

Source

Games and Economic Behavior

Type

Journal article

DOI

10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.003

Restricted until

2037-12-31

Downloads

File

Description

01_McLennan_Simple_complexity_from_2013.pdf (157.21 KB)