Democracy and institutional change in Britain

Abstract

Introduction: Since 1997, Britain has undergone a major programme of constitutional reform, which has reshaped its legislative, electoral and legal institutions. A number of reasons – beyond mere partisan self-interest – could be given to explain the reforms: a desire to limit the authority wielded by the government of the day, to give territorial minorities the opportunities for greater self-expression, to strengthen the legally enforceable rights of individuals over the state, to improve the decision making capacity of the state and thus contribute to economic efficiency, and so on. Among the plethora of reasons that commentators and policy actors themselves have provided for the reforms is the belief that the reshaping of Britain’s core political institutions is a necessary step in improving the links between citizens and government. A representative statement of this position was provided by Tony Blair prior to gaining office: “Changing the way we govern, and not just changing our government, is no longer an optional extra for Britain. So low is public esteem for politicians and the system we operate that there is now little authority for us to use unless and until we first succeed in regaining it.” (‘Democracy’s Second Age’, The Economist, 14th September 1996) This paper explores the claim that institutional reform is a means of strengthening the relations between citizens and political authority. I begin by examining theoretical accounts of the role that institutional reform might play in (re)shaping the relations between citizens and government. In doing so, I suggest various typologies by which the reforms introduced in Britain might be understood. I then go on to consider some of the empirical evidence relating to the impact of constitutional design on citizen-government linkages. This evidence is largely cross-national, although I also report data collected in Britain by which we can begin to assess the effectiveness of the constitutional reforms in meeting the goal set out by the Labour leader. Two cautionary notes are appropriate before embarking. The first is that, although constitutional reform is seen by the main policy actors as a necessary means of strengthening citizen-government links, it is not seen as a sufficient one (nor is it necessarily the dominant rationale for the reforms). Nonetheless, I think it fair to say that supporters of constitutional change have significant expectations – or at least hopes – that the reforms will help bring about such a positive outcome. The second cautionary note relates to the task of assessing institutional reform. We must be cautious when making judgements about the impact of the reforms, since these may not become apparent for a good while yet; the evidence we have thus provides a preliminary picture rather than any conclusive judgements. Show more