Breaking the Constitutional Deadlock: Lessons from Deliberative Experiments in Constitutional Change

dc.contributor.authorLevy, Ron
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-08T22:09:08Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.date.updated2015-12-08T07:22:18Z
dc.description.abstractThis work provides comparative insights into how deliberation on proposed constitutional amendments might be more effectively pursued. It reports on a new nationwide survey of public attitudes to constitutional reform, examining the potential in Australia of innovative Canadian models of reform led by Citizens' Assemblies. Assembly members are selected at random and are demographically representative of the wider public. They deliberate over reforms for several months while receiving instruction from experts in relevant fields. Members thus become 'public-experts': citizens who stand in for the wider public but are versed in constitutional fundamentals. The author finds striking empirical evidence that, if applied in the Australian context, public trust would be substantially greater for Citizens' Assemblies compared with traditional processes of change. The article sets these results in context, reading the Assemblies against theories of deliberative democracy and public trust. One reason for greater public trust in the Assemblies' may be an ability to accommodate key values that are otherwise in conflict: majoritarian democratic legitimacy, on the one hand, and fair and well-informed (or 'deliberatively rational') decision-making, on the other. Previously, almost no other poll had asked exactly how much Australians trust in constitutional change. However, by resolving trust into a set of discrete public values, the polling and analysis in this work provide evidence that constitutional reform might only succeed when it expresses, at once, the values of both majoritarian and deliberative democracy.
dc.identifier.issn0025-8938
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/28892
dc.publisherMelbourne University Law Review Association
dc.rightshttp://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0025-8938/..." author can archive publisher's version/PDF. On a non-profit server" from SHERPA/RoMEO site (as at 17/03/17).
dc.sourceMelbourne University Law Review
dc.source.urihttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1933601
dc.titleBreaking the Constitutional Deadlock: Lessons from Deliberative Experiments in Constitutional Change
dc.typeJournal article
dcterms.accessRightsOpen Access
local.bibliographicCitation.issue3
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage838
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage805
local.contributor.affiliationLevy, Ron, ANU College of Law, ANU
local.contributor.authoremailu5442684@anu.edu.au
local.contributor.authoruidLevy, Ron, u5442684
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.absfor180108 - Constitutional Law
local.identifier.absseo940202 - Electoral Systems
local.identifier.ariespublicationu4203042xPUB61
local.identifier.citationvolume34
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-84873326540
local.identifier.thomsonID000208449900006
local.identifier.uidSubmittedByu4203042
local.type.statusPublished Version

Downloads

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
01_Levy_Breaking_the_Constitutional_2013.pdf
Size:
137.93 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format