Pakistan's Strategic Culture and its Gordian Knot in Afghanistan
Abstract
A paradoxical element of Pakistan’s grand strategy exists in its approach to
Afghanistan. Pakistan’s instrumentalisation of Islamist groups such as the Taliban
has historically been the principal strategic method employed by the military to
minimise Indian influence in Afghanistan. However, this strategy risks jeopardising Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China, which is another method used by
Pakistan to counterbalance India. Beijing’s growing strategic interests in the region
require stability in South Asia, whereas Pakistan’s strategic method in Afghanistan
indicates a preference for instability. The destabilising effect of Pakistan’s support
for Islamist groups, and China’s desire for political and economic stability in South
Asia, indicate latent divergent interests in the Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership. Therefore, this study factors China as a looming constraint on Pakistan’s
Afghanistan policy. This study also examines the psychological and strategic factors underpinning Pakistan’s support for Islamist groups in Afghanistan, and the
strategic constraints on this policy. Advancing the notion of a ‘strategic culture’ in
Pakistan’s military, this study canvasses the concept as an epiphenomenal explanatory factor of its Afghanistan policy, and more instructively, as a factor of strategic
inflexibility.
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Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs
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2037-12-31
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