The Impact of Individual and Collective Performance on Ministerial Tenure

dc.contributor.authorBerlinski, Samuel
dc.contributor.authorDewan, Torun
dc.contributor.authorDowding, Keith
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-07T22:21:17Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.date.updated2015-12-07T08:56:01Z
dc.description.abstractGovernment ministers in Parliamentary democracies are career politicians for whom public service is an important source of motivation. The length of their tenure is controlled by the Prime Minister. We test a simple Principal-Agent model of parliamentary
dc.identifier.issn0022-3816
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/19977
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press
dc.sourceJournal of Politics
dc.titleThe Impact of Individual and Collective Performance on Ministerial Tenure
dc.typeJournal article
local.bibliographicCitation.issue2
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage571
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage559
local.contributor.affiliationBerlinski, Samuel, University College London
local.contributor.affiliationDewan, Torun, London School of Economics - LSE
local.contributor.affiliationDowding, Keith, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU
local.contributor.authoremailu4458840@anu.edu.au
local.contributor.authoruidDowding, Keith, u4458840
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.absfor160603 - Comparative Government and Politics
local.identifier.ariespublicationu4756716xPUB10
local.identifier.citationvolume72
local.identifier.doi10.1017/S0022381609990843
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-77951238391
local.identifier.thomsonID000276466300022
local.identifier.uidSubmittedByu4756716
local.type.statusPublished Version

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