The Impact of Individual and Collective Performance on Ministerial Tenure
dc.contributor.author | Berlinski, Samuel | |
dc.contributor.author | Dewan, Torun | |
dc.contributor.author | Dowding, Keith | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-12-07T22:21:17Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.date.updated | 2015-12-07T08:56:01Z | |
dc.description.abstract | Government ministers in Parliamentary democracies are career politicians for whom public service is an important source of motivation. The length of their tenure is controlled by the Prime Minister. We test a simple Principal-Agent model of parliamentary | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-3816 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1885/19977 | |
dc.publisher | University of Chicago Press | |
dc.source | Journal of Politics | |
dc.title | The Impact of Individual and Collective Performance on Ministerial Tenure | |
dc.type | Journal article | |
local.bibliographicCitation.issue | 2 | |
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage | 571 | |
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage | 559 | |
local.contributor.affiliation | Berlinski, Samuel, University College London | |
local.contributor.affiliation | Dewan, Torun, London School of Economics - LSE | |
local.contributor.affiliation | Dowding, Keith, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU | |
local.contributor.authoremail | u4458840@anu.edu.au | |
local.contributor.authoruid | Dowding, Keith, u4458840 | |
local.description.embargo | 2037-12-31 | |
local.description.notes | Imported from ARIES | |
local.identifier.absfor | 160603 - Comparative Government and Politics | |
local.identifier.ariespublication | u4756716xPUB10 | |
local.identifier.citationvolume | 72 | |
local.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S0022381609990843 | |
local.identifier.scopusID | 2-s2.0-77951238391 | |
local.identifier.thomsonID | 000276466300022 | |
local.identifier.uidSubmittedBy | u4756716 | |
local.type.status | Published Version |