Contingent identity
| dc.contributor.author | Schwarz, Wolfgang | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-07-31T06:52:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-07-31T06:52:53Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-05 | |
| dc.description.abstract | It is widely held that if an object a is identical (or non-identical) to an object b, then it is necessary that a is identical (non-identical) to b. This view is supported an argument from Leibniz's Law and a popular conception of de re modality. On the other hand, there are good reasons to allow for contingent identity. Various alternative accounts of de re modality have been developed to achieve this kind of generality, and to explain what is wrong with the argument from Leibniz's Law. | en_AU |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1747-9991 | en_AU |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1885/14515 | |
| dc.publisher | Wiley | en_AU |
| dc.rights | © 2013 The Author. Philosophy Compass © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/1747-9991/..."author can archive post-print. 2 years embargo" from SHERPA/RoMEO site (as at 31/07/15) | en_AU |
| dc.source | Philosophy Compass | en_AU |
| dc.title | Contingent identity | en_AU |
| dc.type | Journal article | en_AU |
| local.bibliographicCitation.issue | 5 | en_AU |
| local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage | 495 | en_AU |
| local.bibliographicCitation.startpage | 486 | en_AU |
| local.contributor.affiliation | Schwarz, W., School of Philosophy, The Australian National University | en_AU |
| local.contributor.authoruid | u4600298 | en_AU |
| local.identifier.citationvolume | 8 | en_AU |
| local.identifier.doi | 10.1111/phc3.12028 | en_AU |
| local.publisher.url | http://au.wiley.com/WileyCDA/ | en_AU |
| local.type.status | Accepted Version | en_AU |