Optimal redistribution with unobservable disability:Welfarist versus non-welfarist social objectives

dc.contributor.authorPestieau, Pierre
dc.contributor.authorRacionero, Maria
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-07T22:49:30Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.date.updated2016-02-24T12:00:41Z
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the optimal non-linear income and commodity tax when the same labor disutility can receive two alternative interpretations, taste for leisure or disability, but the disability is not readily observable. We compare the optimal policy under alternative social objectives, welfarist and non-welfarist, and conclude that the non-welfarist objective, in which the planner gives a higher weight to the disutility of labor of the disabled individuals, is the only reasonable specification. It has some foundation in the theory of responsibility; further, unlike the other specifications it yields an optimal solution that may involve a lower labor supply requirement from disabled individuals.
dc.identifier.issn0014-2921
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/26781
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.sourceEuropean Economic Review
dc.subjectKeywords: asymmetric information; comparative study; disability; economic geography; income distribution; labor supply; tax system Asymmetric information; Optimal non-linear taxation; Quasi-linear preferences; Responsibility
dc.titleOptimal redistribution with unobservable disability:Welfarist versus non-welfarist social objectives
dc.typeJournal article
local.bibliographicCitation.issue6
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage644
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage636
local.contributor.affiliationPestieau, Pierre, University of Liege
local.contributor.affiliationRacionero, Maria, College of Business and Economics, ANU
local.contributor.authoremailu4048854@anu.edu.au
local.contributor.authoruidRacionero, Maria, u4048854
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.absfor140215 - Public Economics- Taxation and Revenue
local.identifier.ariespublicationu9501697xPUB46
local.identifier.citationvolume53
local.identifier.doi10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.12.002
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-69549096033
local.identifier.thomsonID000270645200003
local.identifier.uidSubmittedByu9501697
local.type.statusPublished Version

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