The “toolbox” of public policies to impact on fertility – a global view

Abstract

This paper aims to describe a wide range of policies that might be used to stop or reverse the downward slide of fertility rates. In advance, however, several points need to be made: 1. Low fertility exists in countries with widely differing institutional structures. Policies to support fertility must work from these pre-existing structures. For example, if child care provided by low-wage, undocumented immigrants is a factor related to higher fertility rates in the United States, this does not mean that this is a policy to be recommended for Sweden which has a long-established, high-quality, state-subsidised child care system. In other words, there can be no single cross-national model for success. Each country must seek its own institutionally-appropriate approach. Also, each country must deal with the realities of its own political economy. Strategies will not be accepted if they are not supported by the populace. For example, while I argue that changes in the level of gender equity within the family are an essential element of a fertility strategy in any country, family organisation is fundamental to cultural identity and revolutionary change is rarely a possibility (McDonald 2000a; McDonald 2000b). 2. Second, as far as possible, policies to support fertility should be based upon a theory or theories as to why fertility has fallen to low levels in a particular setting. Given that fertility-support policies are likely to be expensive in one way or another, some understanding of the nature of low fertility will provide greater efficiency in policy implementation. Below, I review several possible general theories relating to low fertility. Beyond this, it is my view that well-designed market research also has a place in the definition of new policies. That is, we should ask young people what they think would make a difference to their decision-making. 3. Countries should have some notion about what it is that they are aiming to achieve. Inevitably, demographic sustainability (at least zero population growth) is an ultimate aim for all countries. The question is how far into the future is ‘ultimate’? Or expressed differently, how much of a decline in the size of the population or the labour force is the country willing to sustain before demographic sustainability is achieved? The example of Italy is used to illustrate this point. Show more