Cultural advice

The Australian National University acknowledges, celebrates and pays our respects to the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people of the Canberra region and to all First Nations Australians on whose traditional lands we meet and work, and whose cultures are among the oldest continuing cultures in human history.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are advised that ANU Library collections may include images, names, voices, and other representations of deceased persons.

Material in the collection may contain terms, language or views that reflect the period in which the item was created and may be considered inappropriate today.

Robust contracting in general contract spaces

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorBackhoff-Veraguas, Julio
dc.contributor.authorBeissner, Patrick
dc.contributor.authorHorst, Ulrich
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-12T03:56:24Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.date.updated2022-09-25T08:16:55Z
dc.description.abstractWe consider a general framework of optimal mechanism design under adverse selection and ambiguity about the type distribution of agents. We prove the existence of optimal mechanisms under minimal assumptions on the contract space and prove that centralized contracting implemented via mechanisms is equivalent to delegated contracting implemented via a contract menu under these assumptions. Our abstract existence results are applied to a series of applications that include models of optimal risk sharing and of optimal portfolio delegation.en_AU
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_AU
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259en_AU
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/311377
dc.language.isoen_AUen_AU
dc.publisherSpringeren_AU
dc.rights© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2021en_AU
dc.sourceEconomic Theoryen_AU
dc.subjectRobust contractsen_AU
dc.subjectNonmetrizable contract spacesen_AU
dc.subjectAmbiguityen_AU
dc.subjectFinancial marketsen_AU
dc.titleRobust contracting in general contract spacesen_AU
dc.typeJournal articleen_AU
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage945en_AU
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage917en_AU
local.contributor.affiliationBackhoff-Veraguas, Julio, Faculty of Mathematics, University of Viennaen_AU
local.contributor.affiliationBeissner, Patrick, College of Business and Economics, ANUen_AU
local.contributor.affiliationHorst, Ulrich, Department of Mathematics and School of Business and Economics, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlinen_AU
local.contributor.authoruidBeissner, Patrick, u1021120en_AU
local.description.embargo2099-12-31
local.description.notesImported from ARIESen_AU
local.identifier.absfor380303 - Mathematical economicsen_AU
local.identifier.absseo150506 - Market-based mechanismsen_AU
local.identifier.ariespublicationa383154xPUB18571en_AU
local.identifier.citationvolume73en_AU
local.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-021-01354-9en_AU
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-85103280076
local.identifier.thomsonIDWOS:000631298700001
local.publisher.urlhttps://link.springer.com/en_AU
local.type.statusPublished Versionen_AU

Downloads

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
s00199-021-01354-9.pdf
Size:
432.14 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download

Collections

ANU Research Publications

DSpace software copyright © 2002-2026 LYRASIS