Bermudez on Self-Consciousness

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dc.contributor.authorGarrett, Brian
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-13T23:12:27Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.date.updated2015-12-12T08:31:37Z
dc.description.abstractI argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of selfconsciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple
dc.identifier.issn0031-8094
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/88063
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd
dc.sourcePhilosophical Quarterly, The
dc.titleBermudez on Self-Consciousness
dc.typeJournal article
local.bibliographicCitation.issue210
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage101
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage96
local.contributor.affiliationGarrett, Brian, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU
local.contributor.authoruidGarrett, Brian, u9008400
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.description.refereedYes
local.identifier.absfor220313 - Philosophy of Language
local.identifier.absfor220314 - Philosophy of Mind (excl. Cognition)
local.identifier.ariespublicationMigratedxPub17575
local.identifier.citationvolume53
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-60949258814
local.type.statusPublished Version

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