Can 'Intrinsic' Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions?

Marshall, Dan

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Can 'Intrinsic' Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions?

Date

2009

Authors

Marshall, Dan

Publisher

Philosophy Phenomeological Research

Abstract

An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of 'intrinsic' that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/1885/23162

Collections

ANU Research Publications

Source

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Type

Journal article

DOI

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00259.x

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Can 'Intrinsic' Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions?

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