Collective Responsibility and Global Poverty

Abstract

In this chapter I outline my individualist, teleological (normative) account of social institutions and apply it to welfare institutions or, at least, to one kind of welfare institution, namely international institutions concerned with global poverty. I do so in the context of the assumption that, speaking generally, basic needs, for example for food, clean water, shelter, medicines, etc. are, and ought to be, provided for by nonwelfare institutions, notably by business organizations operating in competitive markets. Nevertheless, given the manifest and ongoing failure on the part of such organizations, including in relation to global poverty, there is a need for welfare institutions. In addition, as will become evident below, there is a need to redesign markets and market-based organizations so that they are better able to provide for basic needs.

In this chapter, the author outlines individualist, teleological account of social institutions and applies it to welfare institutions or, at least, to one kind of welfare institution, namely international institutions concerned with global poverty. He also outlines his account of the key moral concept in collective responsibility and distinguishes some different senses of responsibility. Having provided with an account of collective moral responsibility, the author explores the relationship between collective responsibility and social institutions. He elaborates on the notion of a need and makes use of the work of David Wiggins. The author argues that there is a collective moral responsibility to assist the one billion living in absolute poverty, and that this responsibility is a responsibility to establish and maintain appropriate social institutions that is grounded in the aggregate needs-based moral rights of the billion human beings in question.