Two Kinds of Logical Impossibiity

Date

2019

Authors

Sandgren, Alexander
Tanaka, Koji

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that a distinction ought to be drawn between two ways in which a given world might be logically impossible. First, a world w might be impossible because the laws that hold at w are different from those that hold at some other world (say the actual world). Second, a world w might be impossible because the laws of logic that hold in some world (say the actual world) are violated at w. We develop a novel way of modelling logical possibility that makes room for both kinds of logical impossibility. Doing so has interesting implications for the relationship between logical possibility and other kinds of possibility (for example, metaphysical possibility) and implications for the necessity or contingency of the laws of logic.

Description

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Citation

Source

Nous

Type

Journal article

Book Title

Entity type

Access Statement

Open Access

License Rights

Creative Commons Attribution License

DOI

10.1111/nous.12281

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