Understanding Felt Accountability: The institutional antecedents of the felt accountability of agency-CEO's to central government

Date

2021

Authors

Schillemans, Thomas
Overman, Sjors
Fawcett, Paul
Flinders, Matthew
Fredriksson, Magnus
Laegreid, Per
Maggetti, Martino
Papadopoulos, Yannis
Rubecksen, Kristin
Rykkja, Lise H

Journal Title

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Volume Title

Publisher

Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Abstract

The literature on autonomous public agencies often adopts a top-down approach, focusing on the means with which those agencies can be steered and controlled. This article opens up the black box of the agencies and zooms in on their CEO's and their perceptions of hierarchical accountability. The article focuses on felt accountability, denoting the manager's (a) expectation to have to explain substantive decisions to a parent department perceived to be (b) legitimate and (c) to have the expertise to evaluate those decisions. We explore felt accountability of agency-CEO's and its institutional antecedents with a survey in seven countries combining insights from public administration and psychology. Our bottom-up perspective reveals close connections between de facto control practices rather than formal institutional characteristics and felt accountability of CEO's of agencies. We contend that felt accountability is a crucial cog aligning accountability holders' expectations and behaviors by CEO's.

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Citation

Source

Governance: an International journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions

Type

Journal article

Book Title

Entity type

Access Statement

Open Access

License Rights

Creative Commons Attribution License

DOI

10.1111/gove.12547

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