Reasoning a Human Right to Legal Aid
Abstract
Legal aid and human rights have more in common than is usually appreciated:
both are concerned with guaranteeing equality and justice, and both are underpinned
by respect for human dignity (Fleming 2007: 26; Luban 2005: 817 – 18,
839 – 40). But these shared characteristics are not usually the basis on which the
relationship between legal aid and human rights has been explored; rather, the
exercise in the literature is often to propose that one — legal aid — ought to be
brought within the scope of the other — human rights (see, for example, J ü riloo
2015; Kyiv Declaration 2007). Legal aid advocates look to achieving human rights
status as a way of entrenching legal aid, thereby guaranteeing its availability.
Legal aid advocates want legal aid to be admitted into the international human
rights regime, and they make their case not on the basis that legal aid and human
rights are conceptual cousins, but in a rhetorical manner, on the basis that there is
something essentially important about legal aid that means it should be accepted
as a human right.
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Book Title
Access to Justice and Legal Aid: Comparative Perspectives on Unmet Legal Need
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Open Access