Are interpersonal comparisons of utility indeterminate?

Abstract

On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utility are not empirically meaningful and "hence" impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws on the parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguistic meaning, as explored by Quine. The paper discusses several cases of what the empirical evidence for interpersonal comparisons of utility might be and shows that, even on the strongest of these, interpersonal comparisons are empirically underdetermined and, if we also deny any appropriate truth of the matter, indeterminate. However, the underdetermination can be broken non-arbitrarily (though not purely empirically) if (i) we assign normative significance to certain states of affairs or (ii) we posit a fixed connection between certain empirically observable proxies and utility. It is concluded that, even if interpersonal comparisons are not empirically meaningful, they are not in principle impossible.