A test of the democratic peacekeeping hypothesis: Coups, democracy, and foreign military deployments
Date
2020
Authors
Levin, Jamie
MacKay, Joseph
Jamison, Anne Spencer
Nasirzadeh, Abouzar
Sealey, Anthony
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SAGE Publications
Abstract
While peacekeeping’s effects on receiving states have been studied at length, its effects on sending states have only
begun to be explored. This article examines the effects of contributing peacekeepers abroad on democracy at home.
Recent qualitative research has divergent findings: some find peacekeeping contributes to democratization among
sending states, while others find peacekeeping entrenches illiberal or autocratic rule. To adjudicate, we build on recent
quantitative work focused specifically on the incidence of coups. We ask whether sending peacekeepers abroad increases
the risk of military intervention in politics at home. Drawing on selectorate theory, we expect the effect of peacekeeping
on coup risk to vary by regime type. Peacekeeping brings with it new resources which can be distributed as private
goods. In autocracies, often developing states where UN peacekeeping remuneration exceeds per-soldier costs, deployment produces a windfall for militaries. Emboldened by new resources, which can be distributed as private goods
among the selectorate, and fearing the loss of them in the future, they may act to depose the incumbent regime. In
contrast, peacekeeping will have little effect in developed democracies, which have high per-troop costs, comparatively
large selectorates, and low ex-ante coup risk. Anocracies, which typically have growing selectorates, and may face
distinctive international pressures to democratize, will likely experience reduced coup risk. We test these claims with
data covering peacekeeping deployments, regime type, and coup risk since the end of the Cold War. Our findings
confirm our theoretical expectations. These findings have implications both for how we understand the impact of
participation in peacekeeping – particularly among those countries that contribute troops disproportionately in the
post-Cold War era – and for the potential international determinants of domestic autocracy.
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Keywords
coups, democratic peace, peacekeeping, selectorate theory
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Source
Journal of Peace Research
Type
Journal article
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Restricted until
2099-12-31
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