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Demandingness as a Virtue

dc.contributor.authorGoodin, Robert
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-07T22:20:43Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.date.updated2016-02-24T11:11:53Z
dc.description.abstractPhilosophers who complain about the ?demandingness' of morality forget that a morality can make too few demands as well as too many. What we ought be seeking is an appropriately demanding morality. This article recommends a ?moral satisficing' approach to determining when a morality is ?demanding enough', and an institutionalized solution to keeping the demands within acceptable limits.
dc.identifier.issn1382-4554
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/19714
dc.publisherKluwer Academic Publishers
dc.sourceJournal of Ethics, The
dc.subjectKeywords: Moral demandingness; Moral satisficing
dc.titleDemandingness as a Virtue
dc.typeJournal article
local.bibliographicCitation.issue1
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage13
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage1
local.contributor.affiliationGoodin, Robert, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU
local.contributor.authoruidGoodin, Robert, u8911176
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.absfor220305 - Ethical Theory
local.identifier.ariespublicationu4583819xPUB9
local.identifier.citationvolume13
local.identifier.doi10.1007/s10892-007-9025-4
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-59849107867
local.type.statusPublished Version

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