Demandingness as a Virtue
dc.contributor.author | Goodin, Robert | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-12-07T22:20:43Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.date.updated | 2016-02-24T11:11:53Z | |
dc.description.abstract | Philosophers who complain about the ?demandingness' of morality forget that a morality can make too few demands as well as too many. What we ought be seeking is an appropriately demanding morality. This article recommends a ?moral satisficing' approach to determining when a morality is ?demanding enough', and an institutionalized solution to keeping the demands within acceptable limits. | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1382-4554 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1885/19714 | |
dc.publisher | Kluwer Academic Publishers | |
dc.source | Journal of Ethics, The | |
dc.subject | Keywords: Moral demandingness; Moral satisficing | |
dc.title | Demandingness as a Virtue | |
dc.type | Journal article | |
local.bibliographicCitation.issue | 1 | |
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage | 13 | |
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage | 1 | |
local.contributor.affiliation | Goodin, Robert, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU | |
local.contributor.authoremail | u8911176@anu.edu.au | |
local.contributor.authoruid | Goodin, Robert, u8911176 | |
local.description.notes | Imported from ARIES | |
local.identifier.absfor | 220305 - Ethical Theory | |
local.identifier.ariespublication | u4583819xPUB9 | |
local.identifier.citationvolume | 13 | |
local.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10892-007-9025-4 | |
local.identifier.scopusID | 2-s2.0-59849107867 | |
local.identifier.uidSubmittedBy | u4583819 | |
local.type.status | Published Version |