Pareto improvements and Feasible Climate Solutions

Date

2021

Authors

Steele, Katie

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Abstract

Proponents of International Paretianism (IP)—the principle that international agreements should not make any state worse-off and should make some at least better off—argue that it is the only feasible approach to reducing the harms of climate change (see, especially, Posner and Weisbach 2010). They draw on some key assumptions regarding the meaning of 'feasibility' and the nature of the Pareto improvements associated with coordinated action on climate change. This chapter challenges these assumptions, in effect weakening the case for IP and allowing for broader thinking about what counts as a 'feasible' climate solution.

Description

Keywords

climate change, political feasibility, international paretianism, climate game, climate agreement, Prisoners’ Dilemma, pareto improvement, national interest

Citation

Source

Type

Book chapter

Book Title

Philosophy and Climate Change

Entity type

Access Statement

License Rights

Restricted until

2099-12-31