Pareto improvements and Feasible Climate Solutions
Date
2021
Authors
Steele, Katie
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Abstract
Proponents of International Paretianism (IP)—the principle that international agreements should not make any state worse-off and should make some at least better off—argue that it is the only feasible approach to reducing the harms of climate change (see, especially, Posner and Weisbach 2010). They draw on some key assumptions regarding the meaning of 'feasibility' and the nature of the Pareto improvements associated with coordinated action on climate change. This chapter challenges these assumptions, in effect weakening the case for IP and allowing for broader thinking about what counts as a 'feasible' climate solution.
Description
Keywords
climate change, political feasibility, international paretianism, climate game, climate agreement, Prisoners’ Dilemma, pareto improvement, national interest
Citation
Collections
Source
Type
Book chapter
Book Title
Philosophy and Climate Change
Entity type
Access Statement
License Rights
Restricted until
2099-12-31