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Corruption and Auctions

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dc.contributor.authorMenezes, Flavioen_US
dc.contributor.authorMonteiro, Paulo K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2002-05-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned2004-05-19T09:42:35Zen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-05T08:25:50Z
dc.date.available2004-05-19T09:42:35Zen_US
dc.date.available2011-01-05T08:25:50Z
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the outcome of an auction where the auctioneer approaches one of the two existing bidders and offers an opportunity for him to match his opponent's bid in exchange for a bribe. In particular, we examine two types of corruption arrangements. In the first case, the auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid to match the loser's bid in exchange for a bribe. In the second arrangement, the auctioneer approaches the loser and offers him the possibility of matching the winner's bid in exchange for a bribe. While oral auctions are corruption free under the two arrangements, corruption affects both bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller's expected revenue in a first­price auction.en_US
dc.format.extent221755 bytesen_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/40511en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/40511
dc.language.isoen_AUen_US
dc.subjectcorruptionen_US
dc.subjectauctionsen_US
dc.subjectefficiencyen_US
dc.titleCorruption and Auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking/Technical Paperen_US
local.citationWorking Papers in Economics and Econometrics No. 397en_US
local.contributor.affiliationANUen_US
local.contributor.affiliationSchool of Economicsen_US
local.description.refereednoen_US
local.identifier.citationmonthmayen_US
local.identifier.citationyear2001en_US
local.identifier.eprintid342en_US
local.rights.ispublishedyesen_US

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