Security Through Financial Integrity: Mending Pakistan’s Leaky Sieve
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Keatinge, Tom
Moiseienko, Anton
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Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
Abstract
Corruption and Financial Integrity
Corruption in developing countries is a major challenge for development and stability. Illicit
cross-border outflows of corruption proceeds are particularly damaging, as they drain the
country of finances with little chance of them ever being recovered. Pakistan is among the
states that face this challenge. The current government of Pakistan has claimed its commitment
to reducing corruption in the country on many occasions. In addition to repatriating stolen
assets, the effective prevention of corruption-related illicit outflows is key to delivering on
that commitment.
Alongside trade, Pakistan’s financial system is a key conduit for moving value in and out of the
country. It is therefore the first line of defence against the exfiltration of corruption proceeds
from Pakistan. This relates to both the formal financial system, including banks and licensed
exchange companies, and the informal value-transfer systems, better known as hawala or
hundi. Although prohibited by law, hawala and hundi remain widespread in Pakistan. To ensure
the resilience of Pakistan’s financial system against abuse by corrupt actors, it is essential to
drive up financial crime compliance standards in regulated businesses and take enforcement
action against hawaladars operating illegally.
Challenges Facing Pakistan’s Financial System
There are several challenges in relation to the capacity of banks, exchange control companies
and other financial institutions to prevent, detect and report suspicious activities that may be
related to corruption.
Tax Avoidance and Shadow Economy
The first of these challenges is the extent of tax evasion in Pakistan. Much of the country’s
economy operates under the radar of the tax authorities and is therefore cash-based and
undocumented. For a financial institution that seeks to ascertain the legitimacy of its client’s
business, this poses practical challenges. In law, regulated businesses are theoretically
expected to report suspicious activities related to a range of crimes including tax evasion in
the amount equivalent to approximately £55,000. In practice, this poses challenges given the
number of businesses that would have to be reported and investigated in a country where only
approximately 1.5 million people out of 200 million file tax returns, as required by law. Once a
financial institution deals with an individual or business that cannot adequately account for the
source of their money, the capacity to identify where the money comes from – that is, initially
legitimate but untaxed business or criminal activity – is limited.
Tackling this challenge will require several changes to current approaches in both the public and
private sectors. The regulators of Pakistan’s financial sector, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)
and Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), should clarify their expectations
in relation to the reporting of tax evasion. These clarifications should reinforce the need to
comply with reporting obligations while ensuring that financial institutions’ resources are not
disproportionately directed towards addressing tax offences at the expense of other predicate
offences (offences that give rise to criminal proceeds).
Challenges in the Banking Sector
In relation to other predicate offences, including those that are seen as particularly serious –
such as corruption – financial institutions should share best practices in relation to identifying
higher-risk customers – for instance, customers operating in industries known to be particularly
susceptible to criminal infiltration – and establishing the source of their funds and wealth.
As two RUSI workshops held in Karachi suggest, this conversation is still in its infancy, with
most of the banks’ compliance efforts to date being directed at establishing automated
transaction-monitoring processes. The SBP’s supervision style should also be adjusted to pay
greater attention to banks’ understanding and mitigation of risks. The current focus of the SBP’s
enforcement effort has been the implementation of decision-making processes in relation to
the reporting of suspicious transactions, as well as automated transaction-monitoring systems.
Challenges in the Exchange Companies Sector
Outside the banking sector, the activities of exchange companies appear to pose
money-laundering risks. Like banks, they can move funds in and out of Pakistan. But unlike
banks, the ownership of exchange companies is opaque and potential links to politically
exposed persons, who pose higher corruption risks, are impossible for an outside observer to
ascertain. Very little is known about compliance practices in the sector and there is evidence
that at least some Pakistani banks are wary of doing business with exchange companies due to
money-laundering risks. These are exacerbated by the historical ties of exchange companies
with hawala/hundi businesses, which are known for moving money surreptitiously. More visible
SBP supervision of exchange companies is essential, as are enforcement efforts by the Federal
Investigation Agency against unlicensed hawala/hundi operators.
Challenges in Other Parts of the Financial Sector
Businesses regulated by the SECP are only beginning to come to terms with
anti-money-laundering requirements after the SECP promulgated a new set of regulations in
2018. Some of these businesses question either the need for such regulation altogether or
their practical ability to follow it. Outreach and enforcement efforts by the SECP, including the
publication of case studies that show how regulated businesses can be abused for moneylaundering purposes, can both demonstrate the rationale behind the regulations and alert the
sector to the possibility of enforcement.
International Aspects
Private Sector Role
It is not only Pakistani institutions or individuals that are involved in transferring corruption
proceeds out of Pakistan. The role played by overseas banks in their interactions with Pakistani
financial institutions cannot be ignored. Non-Pakistani correspondent banks enable Pakistani
banks to make transfers to a wider range of banks all over the world than would otherwise
be possible. With correspondent banks, including those in London that were interviewed for
this research, being aware of money-laundering challenges that Pakistan faces, they seek to
ensure that their Pakistani respondent banks have appropriate anti-money-laundering controls.
However, this outside pressure has its limits and does not negate the need for changes
discussed above.
Inter-Government Engagement
International engagement on financial crime issues at the government-to-government level
is also ongoing. To date, however, this conversation has largely been at cross-purposes. The
‘grey-listing’ of Pakistan by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2018 has been
perceived as political and therefore unfair in Pakistan. The focus of the FATF on counterterrorist
financing in Pakistan is seen as a foreign preoccupation that unjustly obscures the issue of
greatest relevance to Pakistan itself, namely the proceeds of corruption siphoned off outside
the country. It is possible that this perception could be mitigated if issues related to financial
crime were discussed in concert and covered both terrorist financing and money laundering,
including the questions of exfiltration of corruption proceeds from Pakistan that its government
is concerned about.
A similar mismatch in Pakistani and international illicit finance-related priorities is evident in the
UK–Pakistani relationship, with the UK seen in Pakistan as a prolific enabler of corruption in the
country. In contrast, although the UK government has been active in supporting Pakistan’s criminal
justice development, the predominant focus of UK law enforcement efforts in connection with
Pakistan has been drug trafficking. Combining the UK perspective on Pakistan as a destination
country for the proceeds from drug trafficking and from other organised crime activities, and
Pakistan’s view of the UK as a magnet for corruption proceeds, is vital to promoting a productive
dialogue and cooperation.
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