Secondary belief content, what is it good for?
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Sandgren, Alexander
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Kluwer Academic Publishers
Abstract
Some use the need to explain communication, agreement, and disagreement to argue for two-dimensional conceptions of belief content. One prominent defender of an account of this sort is David Chalmers. Chalmers claims that beliefs
have two kinds of content. The second dimension of belief content, which is tied to what beliefs pick out in the actual world, is supposed to help explain communication, agreement, and dis agreement. I argue that it does not. Since the need to explain these phenomena is the main stated motivation for the addition of the
second dimension of belief content, my arguments also undermine the motivation
for Chalmers’ two-dimensional account of belief content and theories like it.
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Philosophical Studies
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Restricted until
2099-12-31