A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity

Abstract

Geach points out that some pairs of beliefs have a common focus despite there being, apparently, no object at that focus. For example, two or more beliefs can be directed at Vulcan even though there is no such planet. Geach introduced the label 'intentional identity' to pick out the relation that holds between attitudes in these cases; Geach says that '[w]e have intentional identity when a number of people, or one person on different occasions, have attitudes with a common focus, whether or not there actually is something at that focus' (Geach in J Philos 64(20):627-632, 1967). In this paper, I propose a novel theory of intentional identity, the triangulation theory, and argue that it has considerable advantages over its principal rivals. My approach centers on agents' metarepresentational beliefs about what it takes for international attitudes to be about particular objects. Show more