Language, Thought and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness
| dc.contributor.author | Jackson, Frank | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-12-13T23:23:49Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2002 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2015-12-12T09:17:45Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | There are borderline cases of baldness, cases where we are in principle unable to say whether or not a subject is or is not bald. According to the epistemic theory of vagueness, when X is on the borderline, 'X is bald' either is true or is false, and X either definitely is or definitely is not bald, though we cannot determine which it is. There is, that is, such a thing as the correct verdict but we cannot tell which one it is. I argue that the role of language in communicating our thought about how things are makes a strong argument against this theory. | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0271-5309 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1885/91935 | |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | |
| dc.source | Language and Communication | |
| dc.subject | Keywords: Epistemic theory of vagueness; Meaning and use; Vagueness | |
| dc.title | Language, Thought and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness | |
| dc.type | Journal article | |
| local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage | 279 | |
| local.bibliographicCitation.startpage | 269 | |
| local.contributor.affiliation | Jackson, Frank, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANU | |
| local.contributor.authoruid | Jackson, Frank, u8606954 | |
| local.description.embargo | 2037-12-31 | |
| local.description.notes | Imported from ARIES | |
| local.description.refereed | Yes | |
| local.identifier.absfor | 220313 - Philosophy of Language | |
| local.identifier.ariespublication | MigratedxPub22861 | |
| local.identifier.citationvolume | 22 | |
| local.identifier.doi | 10.1016/S0271-5309(02)00007-1 | |
| local.identifier.scopusID | 2-s2.0-23744476075 | |
| local.type.status | Published Version |