Fiscal forward guidance: A case for selective transparency
Abstract
Should the fiscal authority use forward guidance to reduce future policy uncertainty per-
ceived by private agents? Using dynamic general equilibrium models, we examine the wel-
fare effects of announcing future fiscal policy shocks and show that selective transparency
is desirable — announcing distortionary future policy shocks can be detrimental to ex ante
social welfare, whereas announcing non-distortionary shocks generally improves welfare.
Sizable welfare gains are found with constructive ambiguity regarding the timing of a tax
increase in a realistic fiscal consolidation scenario. However, being secretive about distor-
tionary shocks is time inconsistent, and welfare loss from communication may be unavoid-
able.
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Journal of Monetary Economics
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2099-12-31
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