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Determinism, Counterfactuals, and Decision

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dc.contributor.authorSandgren, Alexander
dc.contributor.authorWilliamson, Timothy
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-12T23:15:25Z
dc.date.available2023-12-12T23:15:25Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.date.updated2022-09-11T08:16:31Z
dc.description.abstractRational agents face choices, even when taking seriously the possibility of determinism. Rational agents also follow the advice of Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Although many take these claims to be well-motivated, there is growing pressure to reject one of them, as CDT seems to go badly wrong in some deterministic cases. We argue that deterministic cases do not undermine a counterfactual model of rational deliberation, which is characteristic of CDT. Rather, they force us to distinguish between counterfactuals that are relevant and ones that are irrelevant for the purposes of deliberation. We incorporate this distinction into decision theory to develop ‘Selective Causal Decision Theory’, which delivers the correct recommendations in deterministic cases while respecting the key motivations behind CDT.en_AU
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_AU
dc.identifier.issn0004-8402en_AU
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/309831
dc.language.isoen_AUen_AU
dc.provenanceThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivativesLicense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduc-tion in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY2021, VOL. 99, NO. 2, 286–302https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2020.1764073en_AU
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisen_AU
dc.rights© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Groupen_AU
dc.rights.licenseCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs Licenseen_AU
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_AU
dc.sourceAustralasian Journal of Philosophyen_AU
dc.subjectcausal decision theoryen_AU
dc.subjectcounterfactualsen_AU
dc.subjectdeterminismen_AU
dc.subjectcompatibilismen_AU
dc.titleDeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Decisionen_AU
dc.typeJournal articleen_AU
dcterms.accessRightsOpen Accessen_AU
local.bibliographicCitation.issue2en_AU
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage302en_AU
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage286en_AU
local.contributor.affiliationSandgren, Alexander, Umea Universityen_AU
local.contributor.affiliationWilliamson, Timothy, College of Arts and Social Sciences, ANUen_AU
local.contributor.authoruidWilliamson, Timothy, u5377256en_AU
local.description.notesImported from ARIESen_AU
local.identifier.absfor500300 - Philosophyen_AU
local.identifier.ariespublicationa383154xPUB14510en_AU
local.identifier.citationvolume99en_AU
local.identifier.doi10.1080/00048402.2020.1764073en_AU
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-85087003820
local.identifier.thomsonIDWOS:000544914400001
local.publisher.urlhttps://www.tandfonline.com/en_AU
local.type.statusPublished Versionen_AU

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