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The role of the audit committee in their oversight of whistle-blowing

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Authors

Lee, Gladys
Fargher, Neil

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American Accounting Association

Abstract

We examine the role of the audit committee in their oversight of whistle-blowing. Our study examines whether the quality of the audit committee, captured by its independence, expertise, and diligence, is associated with two whistle-blowing outcomes: the choice of reporting channel (external whistle-blowing versus internal reporting) and the likelihood of retaliation against the whistle-blower. Using a sample of internal and external whistle-blowing cases, we find that a high-quality audit committee reduces the probability that misconduct is reported externally relative to internally, and reduces the probability that a whistle-blower experiences retaliation. We further find that a higher quality audit committee is associated with the implementation of a stronger internal whistle-blowing system, which in turn reduces the likelihood of external relative to internal reporting. Together, our findings suggest that a high-quality audit committee helps to ensure that whistle-blowing disclosures are received and resolved through internal channels.

Description

Citation

Source

Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory

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Access Statement

Open Access

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Restricted until