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Climate change and game theory

Wood, Peter J

Description

This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. We examine the solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, as well as games where players make decisions about treaty participation. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such...[Show more]

dc.contributor.authorWood, Peter J
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-10T23:24:37Z
dc.identifier.issn0077-8923
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1885/67270
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. We examine the solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, as well as games where players make decisions about treaty participation. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, are also examined. Cooperative and noncooperative approaches to coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behavior of coalitions cooperating on climate change. One way to achieve cooperation is to design a game, known as a mechanism, whose equilibrium corresponds to an optimal outcome. This paper examines some mechanisms that are based on conditional commitments, and their policy implications. These mechanisms could make cooperation on climate change mitigation more likely.
dc.publisherNew York Academy of Sciences
dc.sourceAnnals of the New York Academy of Sciences
dc.subjectKeywords: article; behavioral science; climate change; cooperation; cooperative game theory; decision making; economic aspect; financial management; game; government; greenhouse gas; implementation theory; international cooperation; organization and management; ozo Climate change negotiations; Coalition formation; Game theory; Implementation theory; Subgame perfect equilibrium
dc.titleClimate change and game theory
dc.typeJournal article
local.description.notesImported from ARIES
local.identifier.citationvolume1219
dc.date.issued2011
local.identifier.absfor020405 - Soft Condensed Matter
local.identifier.ariespublicationf2965xPUB1428
local.type.statusPublished Version
local.contributor.affiliationWood, Peter J, College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU
local.description.embargo2037-12-31
local.bibliographicCitation.issue1
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage153
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage170
local.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05891.x
local.identifier.absseo970105 - Expanding Knowledge in the Environmental Sciences
dc.date.updated2016-02-24T08:13:48Z
local.identifier.scopusID2-s2.0-79951610663
local.identifier.thomsonID000288933600008
CollectionsANU Research Publications

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