Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowing How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence
Date
2011
Authors
Bengson, John
Moffett, Marc
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Oxford University Press
Abstract
Some of our actions manifest states or qualities of mind, such as intelligence and skill. But what are these states or qualities, and how are they manifested in action? We articulate and examine general intellectualist and anti-intellectualist answers to such questions. One aim is to illuminate some of the main issues and arguments in the contemporary debate over knowledge how. A second aim is to highlight the broader theoretical significance of knowledge how, which may serve as a hinge on which our general understanding of mind and action turns. The role of knowledge how in various debates in ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science is also discussed.
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Book chapter
Book Title
Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action
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2037-12-31
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