Probabilistic Proofs and Transferability
Date
2009
Authors
Easwaran, Kenny
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Wilfrid Laurier University Press
Abstract
In a series of papers, Don Fallis points out that although mathematicians are generally unwilling to accept merely probabilistic proofs, they do accept proofs that are incomplete, long and complicated, or partly carried out by computers. He argues that there are no epistemic grounds on which probabilistic proofs can be rejected while these other proofs are accepted. I defend the practice by presenting a property I call 'transferability', which probabilistic proofs lack and acceptable proofs have. I also consider what this says about the similarities between mathematics and, on the one hand natural sciences, and on the other hand philosophy.
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Philosophia Mathematica
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Journal article
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2037-12-31