NPT regime change: Has the good become the enemy of the best?

Date

2009

Authors

Thakur, Ramesh

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

United Nations University Press

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of total nuclear war between the major powers has diminished. Yet the prospect of nuclear weapons being used is more plausible. There were two great pillars of the normative edifice for containing the nuclear horror: the doctrines of strategic deterrence, which prevented their use among those who had nuclear weapons; and the non-proliferation regime, centered on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which both outlawed their spread to others and imposed a legal obligation on the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to eliminate their own nuclear arsenals through negotiations – their only explicit multilateral disarmament commitment. The NPT was signed in 1968 and came into force in 1970 as the centerpiece of the global non-proliferation regime that codified the international political norm of non-nuclear-weapons status.1 It tries to curb proliferation by a mix of incentives and disincentives. In return for intrusive end-use control over imported nuclear and nuclear-related technology and material, non-NWS were granted access to nuclear technology, components, and material on a most-favored-nation basis.

Description

Keywords

Citation

Source

Type

Book chapter

Book Title

The United Nations and Nuclear Orders

Entity type

Access Statement

License Rights

Restricted until

2037-12-31