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Asymmetric information and R & D competition

Kao, Tina


This paper analyses R&D competition among firms with incomplete information. In a two-stage stochastic R&D game, the first mover possesses private information regarding its R&D progress. The rival can only observe its R&D investments, but not the actual R&D position. R&D investment thus carries both investment and signalling effects. Both complete information and signalling equilibria are possible in the second period. For some parameter ranges, the equilibrium regime is endogenous and depends...[Show more]

CollectionsANU Research Publications
Date published: 2004
Type: Working/Technical Paper


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