Electoral systems and the politics of coalitions : why some democracies redistribute more than others
Date
2003
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Iversen, Torben
Soskice, David
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Abstract
We provide an political-institutional explanation for the considerable variance in the extent to which democratic governments redistributes from higher to lower incomes. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the composition of governing coalitions, whether these are conceived as party-forming alliances of classes or alliances between class parties. Our argument implies a) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, while center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems, and b) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system characteristics in advanced democracies.
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electoral systems, majoritarian systems, equality and redistribution, government partisanship, income distribution, insurance, democratic institutional design, coalitions politics,
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