Levelling counterfactual scepticism
Date
2020
Authors
Sandgren, Alexander
Steele, Katie
Journal Title
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Volume Title
Publisher
Springer International Publishing AG
Abstract
In this paper, we develop a novel response to counterfactual scepticism, the thesis
that most ordinary counterfactual claims are false. In the process we aim to shed
light on the relationship between debates in the philosophy of science and debates
concerning the semantics and pragmatics of counterfactuals. We argue that science
is concerned with many domains of inquiry, each with its own characteristic entities and regularities; moreover, statements of scientifc law often include an implicit
ceteris paribus clause that restricts the scope of the associated regularity to circumstances that are ‘ftting’ to the domain in question. This observation reveals a way
of responding to scepticism while, at the same time, doing justice both to the role of
counterfactuals in science and to the complexities inherent in ordinary counterfactual discourse and reasoning.
Description
Keywords
Counterfactuals, Counterfactual scepticism, Ceteris paribus laws, Contextualism, Hájek
Citation
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Source
Synthese
Type
Journal article
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Access Statement
Open Access
License Rights
Creative Commons licence
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