How to prove Hume’s Law

dc.contributor.author	Russell, Gillian	en
dc.date.accessioned	2025-05-31T01:28:16Z
dc.date.available	2025-05-31T01:28:16Z
dc.date.issued	2021-11-24	en
dc.description.abstract	This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though less controversial, barriers to logical consequence.	en
dc.description.status	Peer-reviewed	en
dc.identifier.issn	0022-3611	en
dc.identifier.other	Bibtex:e5bf404eda154b49ad40f5bdab1018a9	en
dc.identifier.other	ORCID:/0000-0001-6423-0655/work/171157590	en
dc.identifier.scopus	85119861880	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1885/733755740
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.source	Journal of Philosophical Logic	en
dc.subject	Hume’s Law	en
dc.subject	Barriers to entailment	en
dc.subject	Philosophical logic	en
dc.subject	Invalidity	en
dc.subject	Logical consequence	en
dc.title	How to prove Hume’s Law	en
dc.type	Journal article	en
dspace.entity.type	Publication	en
local.contributor.affiliation	Russell, Gillian; School of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, ANU College of Arts & Social Sciences, The Australian National University	en
local.identifier.citationvolume	First Online	en
local.identifier.doi	10.1007/s10992-021-09643-3	en
local.identifier.pure	16623c13-c170-44ed-be31-ce392f4d5311	en
local.type.status	Published	en

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