How to prove Hume’s Law

dc.contributor.authorRussell, Gillianen
dc.date.accessioned2025-05-31T01:28:16Z
dc.date.available2025-05-31T01:28:16Z
dc.date.issued2021-11-24en
dc.description.abstractThis paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though less controversial, barriers to logical consequence.en
dc.description.statusPeer-revieweden
dc.identifier.issn0022-3611en
dc.identifier.otherBibtex:e5bf404eda154b49ad40f5bdab1018a9en
dc.identifier.otherORCID:/0000-0001-6423-0655/work/171157590en
dc.identifier.scopus85119861880en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1885/733755740
dc.language.isoenen
dc.sourceJournal of Philosophical Logicen
dc.subjectHume’s Lawen
dc.subjectBarriers to entailmenten
dc.subjectPhilosophical logicen
dc.subjectInvalidityen
dc.subjectLogical consequenceen
dc.titleHow to prove Hume’s Lawen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dspace.entity.typePublicationen
local.contributor.affiliationRussell, Gillian; School of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, ANU College of Arts & Social Sciences, The Australian National Universityen
local.identifier.citationvolumeFirst Onlineen
local.identifier.doi10.1007/s10992-021-09643-3en
local.identifier.pure16623c13-c170-44ed-be31-ce392f4d5311en
local.identifier.urlhttps://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85119861880en
local.type.statusPublisheden

Downloads