Corruption and an informal security welfare regime: A case study of Pakistan

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between corruption and informal security welfare regimes, where weak formal welfare systems drive reliance on community and patron-client networks. While scholarship on corruption suggests that corruption likely plays a crucial role in shaping and navigating these regimes,, this relationship remains underexplored in research on social welfare. Using Pakistan as a case study, we focus on three core concepts including corruption, patronage/clientelism, and welfare regime to explore and conceptualises the interplay of corruption and an informal security welfare regime. The case suggests that corruption exacerbates inequalities, weakens trust in formal welfare institutions, and reinforces patron-client relationships, while also serving as a necessary tool for marginalized individuals to access social welfare. Our analysis highlights the dual role of corruption in informal security welfare regimes: it acts both as an obstacle to fair welfare provision and as a coping strategy for those excluded from formal systems. In these contexts, reform efforts must account for the functional role of corruption to avoid further destabilising already fragile arrangements. However, achieving this balance is extremely challenging, as corruption itself often undermines both the capacity and the political will to confront the root causes of dysfunction.