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What's right and what's wrong with transference theories

dc.contributor.authorDowe, Philen
dc.date.accessioned2026-01-02T21:41:27Z
dc.date.available2026-01-02T21:41:27Z
dc.date.issued1995en
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the Transference Theory of causation, developed originally by Aronson (1971) and Fair (1979). Three difficulties for that theory are presented: firstly, problems associated with the direction of transference and causal asymmetry; secondly, the case of persistence as causation, for example where a body's own inertia is the cause of its motion; and thirdly the problematic notion of identity through time of physical quantities such as energy or momentum. Finally, the theory is compared with the Conserved Quantity Theory (Dowe 1992c), and it is shown that that account embodies the modifications that the transference theory needs to adopt.en
dc.description.statusPeer-revieweden
dc.format.extent12en
dc.identifier.issn0165-0106en
dc.identifier.otherORCID:/0000-0001-5437-1139/work/162951701en
dc.identifier.scopus1542548688en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1885/733803133
dc.language.isoenen
dc.sourceErkenntnisen
dc.titleWhat's right and what's wrong with transference theoriesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dspace.entity.typePublicationen
local.bibliographicCitation.lastpage374en
local.bibliographicCitation.startpage363en
local.contributor.affiliationDowe, Phil; Department of Philosophyen
local.identifier.citationvolume42en
local.identifier.doi10.1007/BF01129010en
local.identifier.pure5447167d-f479-4cbf-a1b0-2ecf48264c3een
local.identifier.urlhttps://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/1542548688en
local.type.statusPublisheden

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