Bureaucratic Avoidance in China’s Local Governments: The Persistence of Formalism and the Limits of Central Control

Abstract

During the past decade, China's leaders have asserted more centralized control over the country's vast bureaucracy through stricter discipline and accountability mechanisms, expanded administrative regulations, stringent reporting requirements, and elaborate performance evaluations. Local government leaders, particularly at the county and township levels, have, for the purposes of self-preservation, responded to the increased pressures with a variety of countermeasures, collectively known in the Chinese-language policy literature as "formalism." The term "formalism" refers to shirking, feigned compliance and falsification, and a long list of bureaucratic behavior that emphasizes form over substance (zhongxingshi qingshizhi (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)) and process over outcome (zhongquocheng qingjieguo (sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)(sic)). Party leaders see formalism as a serious threat to the Communist Party's policy agenda, and combating it has become a top priority. This article draws on extensive recent field research across six provinces to examine the prevalence and drivers of formalism. We argue that the national state's efforts to combat formalism and strengthen accountability are not only failing but exacerbating the problem. Our findings have critical implications for policy implementation and public management in the PRC. Show more