Status as an Equal

Abstract

Nearly everyone thinks equality, in some sense, is a fundamental requirement of justice; however, there is no consensus about what this commitment amounts to. In recent work, several theorists have argued for a 'social' or 'relational' conception of equality, which holds that the fundamental sense in which equality matters for justice involves the realization of equal social relations and the absence of particular forms of social hierarchy. While there is a growing literature on social egalitarianism, the position remains undertheorized on key issues. Social egalitarians have extensively critiqued what they regard as rival views (luck egalitarianism in particular) but have spent less effort developing the positive details of their own account. Thus, it is not yet entirely clear whether and how the approach is distinct from existing egalitarian views; and more broadly, it is not clear where social egalitarianism stands in relation to well-studied schools of thought such as liberalism and republicanism. This thesis addresses these issues: I offer a characterization of the social conception of equality and situate the view against Rawlsian and neo-republican approaches to the theory of justice