Agent-Relativity and the Foundations of Moral Theory

Abstract

This thesis is concerned with agent-relativity and its importance in understanding and evaluating moral theories. Many would agree with Thomas Hurka that the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality is one of “the greatest contributions of recent ethics”. Among other things, it is important because it has allowed moral philosophers to better explore the logical space of moral theories, enabling them to see promising moral theories that were previously absent from the debate. This thesis continues this project of exploring the logical space of moral theories, and then applies the insights gained to various debates in moral theory. It contains a preface and five chapters. Each chapter is an independent essay that can be read without reference to any of the other chapters. Yet the arguments made in the five chapters overlap in various ways and are united by their focus on agent-relativity. Taken together, here is roughly what these chapters say. There is an important distinction between moral rules and theories that are agent-relative and moral rules and theories that are agent-neutral. Despite some difficulties, this distinction can be made with formal precision. There is also an important related distinction between moment-relative rules and theories and moment-neutral rules and theories. Finally, there is a third important distinction between patient-relative rules and theories and patient-neutral rules and theories. Together, these three distinctions give us a precise way of understanding the structure of moral theories. Traditionally, deontology has been associated with agent-relativity and consequentialism with agent-neutrality. Several philosophers hold that consequentialism can also be agent-relative. For this to be true there must be agent-relative moral values. Some argue that such values are implausible, however, they can be defended by showing that commonsense morality is already committed to them. Thus, agent-relative consequentialism appears plausible. Other philosophers hold that deontology can be agent-neutral. I argue this is false—deontology is necessarily agent-relative. One of the main attractions of deontology is its ability to explain agent-centered constraints. However, when we think through cases involving agent-relativity and moment-relativity we see that deontology faces a trilemma with respect to agent-centered constraints. Either, (i) it is really a version of agent-relative consequentialism, or (ii) it fails to be uniquely action-guiding in cases where commonsense morality requires it, or (iii) it endorses a counterintuitive anti-aggregation principle. This trilemma poses a serious problem for the deontologist and suggests that agent-relative consequentialism is the better theory when it comes to accommodating commonsense morality. Show more