What to do when the world doesn't play along: life after moral error theory

Abstract

This work addresses the ‘what next?’ question for moral discourse, which concerns the best choice of action given the truth of the moral error theory. The moral error theory comprises two claims: (i) that moral discourse is used assertorically, and (ii) that moral assertions systematically fail to state truths. The upshot of the moral error theory is that nothing is really right or wrong—indeed, that the very idea of things being right or wrong is fundamentally mistaken. And yet, I argue, there are strong ar-guments in favour of moral error theory. With such far-reaching implications, we’d do well to have some guidance regarding what we ought to do upon coming to be-lieve that the moral error theory is true. In the first part of this work, I evaluate the answers to the ‘what next?’ question that have been proposed in the current literature. These include a systematic revision of our moral concepts (revisionism), preserving moral language in the spirit of a use-ful fiction (fictionalism), ridding ourselves of moral discourse entirely (abolitionism), and making do with our current erroneous moral discourse (conservationism). I ar-gue that none of the first three proposals offer us an entirely satisfactory answer to the ‘what next?’ question. Conservationism is the most promising solution still on the table. However, conservationism is yet to be fully developed. In the second part of this work, I develop and motivate my own version of conservationism, and show that it is the most attractive response to the ‘what next?’ question; one that is capable of se-curing the many desirable practical goods that our moral practices provide. Show more