Security Institutions, Use of Force and the State: A Moral Framework
Abstract
This thesis examines the key moral principles that should govern
decision-making by police and military when using lethal force.
To this end, it provides an ethical analysis of the following
question: Under what circumstances, if any, is it morally
justified for the agents of state-sanctioned security
institutions to use lethal force, in particular the police and
the military? Recent literature in this area suggests that
modern conflicts involve new and unique features that render
conventional ways of thinking about the ethics of armed conflict,
and the use of lethal force, as inadequate or redundant. In
particular, there is an increased concern with the moral
difficulties created by “non-standard” cases. This is where
the police or military are obliged to operate outside their
conventional contexts. In such non-standard cases, on what moral
basis can (or should) state actors – especially the police and
military – use lethal force?
One approach argues that there is nothing morally exceptional
about the use of lethal force by police or military. This says
the only available moral justification for using lethal force is
killing in self-defence or defence of others. In contrast, I use
an institutional approach to develop a moral framework for the
state’s morally exceptional use of lethal force. The
institutional approach is concerned with the ends (telos) or
purpose of a social institution. It says that the moral purpose
of a social institution alters the moral responsibilities of its
agents; what is referred to as role morality. My analysis
demonstrates that there is an important moral distinction between
justified killing in self-defence and state-sanctioned uses of
lethal force. My claim is that police and military uses of
lethal force are not morally justified in the same way as the
average person’s use of lethal force (i.e. self-defence or
defence of others). Instead, I argue that the state-sanctioned
institutional role of police and military give these state actors
special moral duties, and therefore exceptional moral
justification, for using lethal force.
I argue that the institutional end of the police is the
preservation of public safety. This includes using lethal force
where it is necessary to protect life and prevent serious injury
to jurisdictional inhabitants. In contrast, a morally
responsible state uses military force to defend the “common
good.” That is, when it is necessary to defend the peaceful
functioning of a state from armed threats or other forms of
political violence. I then conclude that non-standard cases
require the addition of jus ad vim (or the just use of military
force short-of-war) as a hybrid element to the moral framework
for the state-sanctioned use of lethal force. This provides a
better way of applying ethics to the use of military force when
defending the common good against serious threats in non-standard
cases. This is because jus ad vim complements the conventional
military paradigm by permitting the use of military capabilities
to defend the common good. But, at the same time, it inhibits
the move towards the more destructive levels of violence
characteristic of conventional warfighting.
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